The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.
Introduction
The Italian corporate governance system features large ownership concentration and the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms in a way that is conducive to controlling shareholders' dominance at the expenses of minority shareholders. At director level, the Italian corporate governance system is characterized by the widespread recourse to interlocking directorships (directors sitting in more than one board at the same time, ID thereafter). A number of reforms have been implemented over the last 15 years to open up the market for corporate control and to protect minorities. The latest addition to this wave of reforms was a new law provision in 2011: article 36 of the "Save Italy" Law ruled out interlocking directorships within the financial industry, effective from 2012.
The purpose of this paper is to assess which effects this reform had on ID. Using the instruments of network analysis, we compare the network before (2009) and after (2012) the reform and we find that after this regulation the concentration of the Italian network of companies decreased only slightly. The companies at the center of the director network managed to reduce their links with the periphery while keeping their strategic connections.
Therefore the law has not been effective in delivering its aim of dispersing the ID network.
This work is organized as follows: section 2 reviews some model of ID, in section 3 we present the reforms of corporate governance in the period 2010-2011, then we introduce the dataset and the methodologies used (both in section 4). We present the results in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
Interlocking directorship: some theory
ID had been pointed out as the "root of many evils" by Brandeis (1914) . Probably because Brandeis was one of President Wilson's counselors, in 1914 the Clayton Act prohibited ID among competitors. According to the principle that "no man can serve two masters", ID were seen as a tool to decrease competition, therefore damaging the market.
During the past decades, the first theoretical problem was to justify the presence of ID on the board of directors. Among the theories trying to explain it, there are two main views: the first one sees ID as a relation between institutions; the second one focuses its attention on the relationship among individuals.
The first model that sees ID as an instrument to connect institutions is the Resource
Dependence Model proposed by Selnick (1947) . According to this model, companies face enormous uncertainty in their business life about customers, suppliers, competitors, macroeconomic conditions or other features. This model sees ID as a tool to reduce uncertainty. Firms create interlocks in order to have more power to control and predict at least some part of the uncertainty they face. That is why a part of ID brings vertical/horizontal integration or is between institutions belonging to the same industry.
Moreover, firms look for intangible resources, such as information, business practice or prestige, when they interlock.
In the Financial Control Model capital is the key source to explain ID, because it is a tool to have easier access to this crucial resource. There is large empirical evidence of ID among banks and industrial companies. Dooley (1969) , Mizruchi (1998) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) found more ID with banks in those companies with an increasing demand for capital. Having a banker (the director holding both industrial and banking directorships) on a company board reduces information asymmetries between the bank and the industrial company. Therefore, companies may benefit in raising more debt capital; in addition, the banker ensures better monitoring during debt life (Pfeffer and Salancick 1978) . The banker faces a conflict: sitting on the board of the industrial company should maximize shareholders' values; at the same time he should maximize bank debt value. A simple way to maximize bank debt value is to reduce company leverage. But reducing company leverage is a benefit for shareholders only if the current leverage ratio is above the optimal level. On the other hand, we explained before how having a banker on their board may give industrial company the opportunity to raise more debt.
According to the Collusion Theory, ID permits the creation of communication channels between companies to make agreements against consumers. Interlocking directorships is seen as an instrument to cartelize a market because sharing directors allows cartel participants to have an observer in place monitoring activities that could undermine the cartel agreement. A system based on direct IDs may thus potentially produce economic inefficiencies. Pennings (1980) found a positive association between industry concentration and horizontal ties.
The Management Control Model is the first that considers ID as a link among individuals and not institutions. The model stresses the power of managers in pursuing strategies that are not in line with shareholders' interests. Managers tend to appoint as directors managers from other companies so that they are busy and passive, and do not contradict those who called them in their role. Palmer (1983) investigated what happens when a link between two firms disappears due to the death or retirement of the director.
Only a minority of these links are created again after they disappear: if these links were functional to connect two institutions they would be promptly reconstituted. According to Koening et al. (1979) , managers use ID to increase their power. Interlocked directors are often passive and never vote against managers that "hired" them. Hallock (1997) studies the effect of cross interlocks between CEO's on director's compensation, finding an increase in CEO salary of about 17% due to the presence of interlocks.
The Class Hegemony Model describes ID as the result of a strong social cohesion. In Useem (1984) directors contact other directors following a relationship pattern: for example, they go to the golf club or country club, they share the same beliefs and values, and they often have a shared political view. In other words, they all belong to the same upper class and form a business elite. Etzion and Davis (2008) find that the Bush administration recruited more heavily from among corporate officers and directors than the Clinton administration. The Career Advancement Model (Stockman et al., 1988; and Perry and Peyer, 2005) focuses on the interest of each single interlocked director. Directors interlock following three drivers: compensation, prestige, and future networking and job opportunities. This theory supports the idea that interlocks is about skills and knowledge: in order to gain a higher salary, prestige and opportunities, directors will strive to offer those competences that the market is looking for. This creates a serious problem for the effectiveness of corporate governance: directors may be captured in a closed circle of people which promotes conformism and therefore less questioning on the choices of the managers reducing monitoring (Subrahmanyam, 2008) .
Corporate Governance Reforms
During the last 15 years the Italian capitalism has undergone a deep reform process, pointing towards a corporate governance model based on the Anglo-American form (Enriques, 2009; Enriques and Volpin, 2007) . The Italian capitalism has been characterized by the presence of cross shareholdings, pyramidal groups and as well as ID. Santella et al. (2009) and Drago et al. (2015) provide evidence that Italian capitalism was characterized by the use of the cross-financial participation by the "industrial families". In both cases cross-financial participation was typically associated with a dense interlocking directorship structure. Rinaldi and Vasta (2005) consider the historical relevance of ID in the inter-war period, in particular they consider the capacity of the "big linkers" to stabilize the system. Pyramidal groups (Bianchi et al., 2001) arise in this context as instruments to separate ownership and control. Within this framework Dyck and Zingales (2004) claim that in Italy there is a relation between high private benefits of control and lower levels of investor protection. In order to protect the minority rights and to enforce these rights, various reforms of corporate governance have been enacted: otherwise losing the appointments.
We point out that the effects of the Law were in place when the data for our study was collected (December 31, 2012) . Therefore, it is legitimate comparing 2012 to 2009 to check whether the provision was effective in reducing ID in the financial sector. 
Data and Methods
This study considers two ID networks, the first one related to 2009 and the second one to 2012. Data were collected among listed companies by considering the board of directors for each firm at 31/12. Only the management board is considered for the few companies that have the two-tier system. 3 We consider the public data collection in Consob (the Italian stock market regulator) which allows to extract data relating to the board and the ownership of the Italian companies. To collect the network data we consider the single name and the related company and we are thus able to create the two-way matrix, from which we are able to perform the one mode projection in order to obtain the adjacency matrices both for the network of directors and for the network of companies. From the adjacency matrices we are able to detect the communities.
To detect the global changes of the network data structure before and after the reforms (see De Nooy et al., 2011) , the data analysis is divided in two distinct parts: first, we graphically analyze the networks and we obtain the structural indicators as the Freeman degree, the betweenness, the density 4 for both years 2009 and 2012. We consider whole network multiple measures as: Components, Component Ratio, Connectedness, and Fragmentation 5 (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . The results are compared and the nodes with the highest betweenness and Freeman degree centrality are taken in to account in order to observe the network zone which is characterized by the most central nodes.
Then we consider the community detection techniques to ascertain whether there are differences in the community structures of 2009 and 2012. We expect that the corporate governance reform of art. 36 in 2011 will have changed the structure of the network in 2012 and that there are different community structures in the two years. Community detection methodologies allow us to ascertain groups of nodes which present more dense structure as connections and weaker connections belonging to other communities. In particular, it is possible to observe that the distribution of the edges is locally inhomogeneous and that there is a concentration of very high edges in these groups and there is a low concentration between the different groups (Fortunato, 2010) . Community detection allows us to detect different groups of nodes that may have similar function in the network. Moreover, we can identify the single position or role of the nodes in the different communities (Fortunato, 2010) . The most central nodes in the groups can have an important role in maintaining the stability and the order in the node groups. Furthermore, nodes in the boundaries of the network may mediate between different communities and 4 The Freeman degree and the betweenness are different measures of node centrality in a network. The
Freeman degree is based on the connections of the nodes inside a network. The betweenness is a computed by considering the shortest paths passing through the defined node to all the different vertices. The density is the ratio of the number of the edges on a specific network on the possible edges. allow both information diffusion and exchange between different communities (Fortunato, 2010; Csermely, 2008) .
Several methods have been proposed to detect communities in a network, yielding to different results (Leskovec et al., 2010) . Following Fortunato (2010) and Newman (2004) , it is possible to distinguish them in traditional methodologies (hierarchical clustering, partitioned clustering, and graph partitioning and spectral clustering), and divisive algorithms (the Newman-Girvan algorithm see Newman and Girvan 2004 ). There are also many methods based on the optimization of the modularity. 6 The clear advantage of using methods based on modularity is that these methods allow us to choose the number of communities considered with an objective matrix (Newman and Girvan 2004) . In fact,
there is the assumption that a very good partition is associated with a high value of modularity (Fortunato, 2010; Newman, 2006) .
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The Newman-Girvan algorithm we use in this work detects communities by progressively removing edges from the original network. The connected components of the remaining network are the communities. Vertex betweenness is an indicator of highly central nodes in networks. For any node i, vertex betweenness is defined as the number of shortest paths between pairs of nodes that run through it. The algorithm extends this definition to the case of edges, defining the "edge betweenness" of an edge as the number of shortest paths between pairs of nodes that run along it. If there is more than one shortest path between a pair of nodes, each path is assigned equal weight such that the total weight of all of the paths is equal to unity. If a network contains communities or groups that are only loosely connected by a few inter-group edges, then all shortest paths between 6 Modularity measures to what extent a network can be divided in different parts.
7 Other methods include greedy techniques, the simulated annealing and the extremal optimization, spectral algorithms like random walk (Hughes, 1995) and those based on blockmodeling (Fortunato, 2010) . different communities must go along one of these few edges. Thus, the edges connecting communities will have high edge betweenness (at least one of them). By removing these edges, the groups are separated from one another and so the underlying community structure of the network is revealed.
The algorithm's steps for community detection are summarized below
1. The betweenness of all existing edges in the network is calculated first.
2. The edge with the highest betweenness is removed.
3. The betweenness of all edges affected by the removal is recalculated.
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until no edges remain.
The method maximizes the Q modularity index (see Newman and Girvan, 2004; Chen et al., 2014 for a discussion of the methods), to obtain the best partitions. 
Results
We start by analyzing the structural characteristics of the networks. In particular we visualize the networks of 2009 and 2012 by observing their structure. Figures 1 and 2 show a somehow stable situation in the two years. In fact, the density is slightly reduced from 0.02 to 0.017 (table 1) , and the structure of the network seems stable. growth of the clustering coefficient 9 is expected and it is due to the reduction of the edges and the convergence of the network to a small world structure (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) .
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here]
[ Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] What is changing is the number of the nodes which show a higher betweenness. It is possible to note that there is an increase in the number of nodes which show a higher betweenness. This is probably due to a reduction of the density in the network in 2012. In fact with the reduction of the edges, some nodes can become more relevant on the network flow (the concept of centrality and network flow is studied in Borgatti 2005) . At this point we are able to detect the communities: we consider all the nodes and use the Girvan-Newman method to detect the communities to be found in the network. We are able to identify 34 communities in the first year and 32 in the second year. We maximize the Q index (in order to maximize the modularity) by considering all the different possible The two different partitions are analyzed in order to detect the patterns it is possible to observe in the data. It is interesting to note that the community "0" increases from 41 companies to 60 (table 6) , receiving firms from most of the other communities. 10 The community "1" was small in 2009 (4 companies) but three years later it grows to 23 receiving 19 companies from community "3". In turn community "3" shrinks from 51 to 6, and growing from 31 to 50 companies. Most of the changes occur in these three groups, whereas the others remain quite stable. The companies which are in the stable groups in 2009 and 2012 are also characterized by high betweenness and in general by high centrality (see the averages but also the minima and the maxima for the considered observations in table 7).
[ Tables 6 and 7 about here]
The Appendix reports to which community each company belongs in the two years.
Financial companies fit in community "3" in 2009, where most of the switching happened in 2012. For example, Assicurazioni Generali moves to group "1" and its controlled branch Banca Generali to group "11". Many financial companies (such as Gemina, Intesa San Paolo, Mediobanca, Unione di Banche Italiane) move to group "1", which becomes the new community for banks and insurance companies. Therefore, the "financial community"
is basically rebranded, but still highly interlinked Interestingly, Unicredit remains in group "3", and represents the main financial company seceding from the others.
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We can observe that the community considering the some from the most central companies in the network tends as well to be strongly connected. Thus we are able to observe that these linkages seem to be very stable over time. In particular we have repeated the same analysis for the companies by considering the community result for 2009 and for 2012, and we can conclude that the most central companies tend to exhibit a stronger stability in their structures. However, the related linkages on the entire network seem to lose strength in their ties and we can visualize as well that in the center of the network there is a reduction of the edge ties ( figure 3 and figure 4 ). This means that there is a similar structure which is maintained by considering less interlocking directorships between the companies. So the structure seems to be "economized" whilst maintaining the original structure. The only change in the structure is the increased equality of the central nodes in 2012 related to Freeman degree and betweenness.
These results are consistent with previous results on the Italian network. We briefly summarize some relevant results for the Italian directorship networks found in literature in table 8. Some authors (Bellenzier and Grassi 2013 , Gambini et al. 2012 , Santella et. al. 2007 found that the network density tends to reduce over the years [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . In this sense the results need to be considered in a longer time window. In any case the reduction of some important structural indicators for the network seems to be confirmed in this work.
At the same time we found that the centrality tends to reduce for the nodes over time. Corrado and Zollo (2006) , who studied the interplay between privatizations and corporate 11 The companies belonging to the Ligresti family (Fondiaria Sai, Milano Assicurazioni and Premafin) moved to group "3" to group "18" because they were rescued by Unipol, which in 2012 also moved to group governance reforms in Italy focusing on ownership, found evidence of destructuration at the macro level of the network, with substantial stability at lower levels of the analysis.
Similar effects of different regulations on networks were found by Drago et al. (2009) which showed that the reforms of corporate governance in the period 1998-2007 had an impact on the networks considered. We also found a community structure in the Italian directorship network and in this case the result is consistent with Piccardi et al. (2009) .
However, here we were interested in studying the stability of the communities and more importantly the stability of their structure in the period 2009-2012. Therefore, it is interesting to note that there is a considerable stability of the network communities extracted at the center of the network. In particular, they tend to preserve the number of participants over 2009-2012 and to preserve their characteristics of centrality in the system. This result is interesting as it shows a particular role of these nodes as general connectors of the system. A similar result for Italy and Germany was obtained by Bellenzier and Grassi (2013) and by Milaković et al. (2009 Milaković et al. ( , 2011 . Therefore, the final empirical evidence
shows that there exists a core at the center of the network showing characteristics of stability but have at the same time the characteristics of a network community in line with the definitions in literature (higher internal density weak external connections).
Conclusions
In this work we have investigated the structure of the Italian network during the period 2009-2012 and the impact of a reform on corporate governance in the period. Beside standard network statistics, we have introduced the tool of community detection to highlight the changes (and the continuity) of the network after the reform that outlawed ID in the financial sector. We found that there were some changes in the network structure over the period, as the density and the connectedness decreased in the period, and the isolates increased in number. At the same time increased fragmentation is observed. This is evidence of some changes in the network functioning. However, the community of financial companies -to which the reform was addressed -and which represent the core of the network, tended to remained closely connected, therefore overcoming the reform.
Specifically, most of the financial community moved to another group, keeping its links.
Therefore, it appears that the reform has failed to deliver its expected results. One reason could be that ID are a symptom of cross-shareholding and therefore regulation aimed at breaking these networks should firstly address the former rather than the latter.
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